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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ORGANIZATION OF A FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIELS H. BUNDSGAARD Danish Army

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Lieutenant Colonel Niels H. Bundsgaard Danish Army

> Colonel Michael A. Pearson Project Advisor

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Organization of a future European Security and Defense Identity.

A new European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is evolving. The development will be influenced by a diversity of interests. These include a continued strong transatlantic link and the policy of countries seeking a closer cooperation in Europe, including countries like Denmark that have chosen to stay outside the defense cooperation. How can a future ESDI be organized and how will it be related to the already existing organizations, NATO, the EU, and the WEU?

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INTRODUCTION

As a basis for the study of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), this paper will describe the term and development of ESDI including the present status of ESDI in relation to the involved organizations, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU). The paper will define major interests by looking at those European countries which seek further integration within the EU, other European countries including non-EU Allies and the United States (US).

Besides the influence of different national interests, development of an ESDI should also be based on the principle of minimum duplication, ensuring the most efficient military capability for NATO as well as for the ESDI. Developing different models for a future ESDI, it is natural to look at the possibilities to keep an ESDI as integrated in NATO as possible or as a part of the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the EU. As an alternative model, the establishment of a new European organization is included as an alternative possibility. This report analysis different models based upon the previous defined major interests and organizational factors.

This paper will recommend a model for a future ESDI. The recommendation will be based on the outcome of the analysis and will not be driven by the latest development of the ESDI. It is

not a study which tries to predict where the ESDI is heading, but more a study which tries to recommend how an ESDI should be developed.

Deadline for collection of information was December 31, 1999.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

DESCRIPTION

The purpose of ESDI is to strengthen the European pillar within the NATO Alliance by making the European Allies take greater responsibility and make a more coherent contribution to NATO. Furthermore, ESDI is to enable the European Allies, in agreed circumstances, to undertake military operations with support from NATO assets without the Alliance itself being directly involved.¹

The development of ESDI has been a continuing process that has taken place within the Alliance, the EU and the WEU. The end of the cold war allowed a broader European concept for security, the enlargement of NATO, and a growing importance of crisis management and peace support operations. This formed the framework in which the development has taken place.²

BACKGROUND

The idea of an "European Pillar", first proposed by US

President John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s, ³ and the growing American pressure for burden-sharing have together with the European Allies experience from the operations in the Balkans 4 formed the background for the emerging ESDI. The first discussions on the development of an ESDI took place at the NATO Summit meeting in Brussels in 1994. It was followed up by meetings in Berlin and Brussels in 1996. It was decided to initiate a close cooperation between NATO and the WEU and that NATO under certain circumstances would be ready to make assets available for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies. As a part of this concept, Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) were developed ⁵. Relevant tasks for WEU operations were agreed to be humanitarian assistance and rescue tasks as well as crisis management situations including both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These are the so called "Petersberg Missions" tasks defined at a WEU meeting in Petersberg in 1992 6. Territorial Defense (Article V of the NATO Treaty) was not included.

At the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in July 1997 it was confirmed that the WEU would take the role as the military arm of the EU and that the capacities of the WEU including the operational planning capacity, headquarters and satellite center would be made available for the EU.

The development of ESDI took a new direction when Heads of

State and Government of France and Britain met at St. Malo on December 4, 1998. In a joint declaration they called for a CFSP in the EU based on the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible forces.⁸

STATUS OF ESDI

At the NATO Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999

Heads of states and governments acknowledged that the EU should have the capacity for autonomous military action, where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. The coordination between NATO and the EU should be based on the existing relations between NATO and the WEU, and the involvement of non-EU European Allies was to be ensured in EU-led crisis response operations. The concept of having separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities was to be further developed. The Summit meeting also launched a Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) in order to improve the defense capabilities of the Alliance.

The EU Cologne meeting in June 1999 welcomed the joint French-British statements from St. Malo and confirmed the need for a CFSP backed up by credible forces making the EU capable of conducting "Petersberg Missions" on its own. It was furthermore decided that parts of the WEU should be integrated in the EU.¹⁰

The development of a CFSP and partial integration of the WEU in the EU was confirmed at the WEU meeting in Luxembourg in

November 1999. To ease the integration and relations between the WEU and the EU, Mr. Javier Solana, the former NATO Secretary General who had been appointed as High Representative for the CFSP in the EU, was appointed as the Secretary General of the WEU. 11

Finally, in the European Council meeting in Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, the Council agreed on the requirement that Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy and sustain for at least one year a military force of up to 50-60,000 soldiers capable of the full range of "Petersberg tasks". New political and military bodies and structures will be established in order to enable the EU the capability to issue the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations. It is anticipated that a permanent Political and Security Committee, an EU Military Committee and an EU Military Staff including a Situation Center will be established. NATO remains, however, the foundation of the collective defense for its members, and will continue to have an important role in crisis management. 12

SUMMARY

The ESDI has changed its character during the process of development. From being a matter of burden-sharing between Americans and European Allies, it evolved into a European requirement for a capability to act autonomously in non-Article

V operations when the Alliance as a whole was not involved.

The recent development has changed ESDI into a CFSP within the EU. Although the final organization of political and military bodies has not yet been decided, it is clear that the WEU will more than likely lose its role and that the EU will take over the responsibility for non-Article V operations if conducted outside the framework of NATO.

INTERESTS

PRO EU INTEGRATION

The major powers of Europe are all seeking a higher degree of integration in the EU including a CFSP backed up by credible forces.

France is recognized to be the lead country in the developments of the CFSP in the EU. According to the French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, France, working together with Britain, led the way in convincing the other EU member states in creating a capability for conducting autonomous military actions within the EU.¹³

Until four years ago, Germany's constitution did not allow soldiers to be deployed beyond the national borders. However, after a change in the constitution, Germany currently has troops serving in both Bosnia and Kosovo. 14 The German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder now officially says that "The EU must get

political and military structures, and the ability of crisis awareness and crisis management". 15

The major shift in policy, which enabled the EU to pursue a CFSP came from Britain. At the 1998 joint French-British meeting in St. Malo, Prime Minister Tony Blair called for a CFSP backed up by credible forces. 16

The proposals for establishing a force of 50-60,000 ready for deployment under the EU came from France, Britain, Germany and Italy - the major powers in the EU.¹⁷ Besides having the wish for a capability to use military assets, the EU also wants to use both diplomatic and economic measures to promote democracy and stability in central and Eastern Europe ¹⁸.

NATO is still envisioned to be the main organization, when it comes to collective defense, but as expressed by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, when talking about the relations between United States and the EU; "The United States has to make a choice. They have always been for sharing the burden. They have never been much for sharing the decision-making.¹⁹"

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Not all European Allies are seeking towards a closer military cooperation in the EU.

The Danish Government accepted the common EU proposal for the CFSP including the creation of available forces even though

Denmark had to include a reservation which states that Denmark does not participate in decisions or actions which have defense implications. Due to this reservation Denmark will not contribute with forces to an EU led operation. Denmark emphasizes that NATO is the primary forum for security and that autonomous action by the EU can only take place if NATO as a whole is not engaged. Like Ireland, Denmark would have liked to see it clearly expressed that the forces, now agreed upon to back up the CFSP, are not the beginning of creating an European Army 22.

The European Allies, which are not a member of the EU, fear that the EU Allies will form their "own EU alliance" within NATO, which eventually will lead to lack of influence for countries like Norway and Turkey.²³

US INTERESTS

The United States welcomes the result of the Helsinki meeting, but makes it quite clear that the American position is a need for a stronger Europe. At the same time reaction forces available to the EU must not undermine the strength of NATO.²⁴

Although the US administration officially is satisfied with the latest development in the EU, the Congress is not yet convinced that the Europeans will be ready to spend the necessary money.²⁵ Recently, Defense Secretary William Cohen

criticized Germany for reducing its military expenditure to 1.5% of its gross national product, half of what US spends. If the European Allies do not increase their defense budgets, they will, according to Cohen, not survive the gap in military capabilities which continues to grow between the European Allies and the US.²⁶

The United States claims that NATO should have first option on any military operation and that in reality there can be no separation of capabilities.²⁷ Furthermore, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott points out that the EU must acknowledge the interests of Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and be prepared to include them in the decision-making process.²⁸

CONCLUSION

The major European powers seek an integrated Europe capable of using all instruments of power, be they diplomatic, economic or military measures. This includes the ability to make decisions and launch military operations on their own.

Other European countries represent a variety of positions ranging from support to the CFSP in the EU, to the interest in keeping NATO as the forum for all military activities. Special arrangements must be established for non-EU Allies.

The United States' focus remains on burden-sharing,

increased capabilities by the European Allies and a first call for NATO in any military operation.

ORGANIZATION

STRUCTURE

Before looking at alternative models for constructing an ESDI, it is necessary to look at the requirements for political and military bodies.

The Helsinki conclusions envision a permanent Political and Security Committee and a Military Committee. The EU is also looking for its own Military Staff and besides having readily deployable troops, the EU also wants to develop early warning means, prepare the establishment of a European Air Transport Command and enhance the strategic sea lift capacity.²⁹

The original arrangements developed in 1997 between NATO, the EU, and the WEU were based on the use of the limited capacity of the WEU (small operational planning staff, situation center and satellite center)³⁰ and reinforcements from NATO including planning capacity and command arrangements. Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe was planned to be the superior military commander.³¹

EFFICIENCY

Besides being politically feasible, a future organization

of the ESDI should also be as effective as possible from a military and organizational point of view.

The United States has repeatedly tried to influence the development in a direction where duplication of capacities is avoided. Creation of new bodies will take away resources which otherwise could have improved the overall capacity of the Alliance. This point was expressed clearly by NATO's Secretary General George Robertson who said: "You can have all the fancy institutions in the world, the most powerful flow of charts and wiring diagrams, but without proper capabilities, trained troops ready to go with the right equipment and the right backup, you can't deal with a crisis. You can't send a wiring diagram to a crisis". 32

The trend concerning defense spending by the European Allies does not allow for both modernization of armies and duplication of a military staff, committees, and strategic assets. The defense budgets of the European Allies have steadily declined from an average on 3.6 percent of their gross national products in the period 1980-84 to 2.2 percent in 1996.³³

CONCLUSION

The establishment of an ESDI is more than just having forces and a CJTF made available, it also requires possession of or access to political and military committees, a military staff

and strategic assets.

In order to minimize costs and ensure sufficient operational military capacities within the declining European defense budgets, duplication of effort should be avoided.

MODELS FOR A FUTURE ESDI

<u>ALTERNATIVE MODELS</u>

When assessing future models for an ESDI it is essential to develop alternative models, which are fundamentally different in nature. This will offer the best possibilities for a thorough analysis even though the recommendation might be a compromise of more models.

It is natural to look at models based on NATO and the EU respectively. As an alternative model, a new European security organization is developed. For all the described models, the capability for conducting independent military operations by the Europeans is considered a basic requirement. A model for a future ESDI, which only is based on a more balanced burdensharing within the Alliance, is consequently considered politically unrealistic.

ESDI IN NATO

The first model proposes that NATO remain the responsible organization for the collective defense and the primary forum

for crisis management. NATO will have first call on forces during any crisis and the forces will be earmarked alone to the Alliance.

The ESDI will be focused on the Defense Capability

Initiative in order to improve the military capacity within the

European Allies. NATO will prepare and exercise to allocate

resources to the EU if NATO (read US) decides not to engage as a

whole. Arrangements will ensure that non-EU European Allies,

Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries and even Canada can

participate on a volunteer basis.

In peacetime, the EU will only have very limited military capacity in form of the assets taken over from the WEU.

ESDI IN THE EU

In the second model, the EU develops its own substantial defense capacity with permanent political and military bodies and a military staff as well as strategic assets including intelligence and communication.

The ESDI will be focused on modernization of the armed forces, which will be dual assigned for both EU and NATO.

Furthermore common European capabilities are to be developed.

NATO is still responsible for the collective defense. In case of "Petersberg Missions", it has to be decided on a case by case basis whether NATO or the EU will take on the tasks and

have a CJTF and forces made available.

Special arrangements will be made for non-EU countries.

ESDI WITHIN A NEW ORGANIZATION

In the final model, a new European defense organization (EUDO) is established with the purpose of having the capability to conduct "Petersberg Missions", in case NATO (US) decides not to be engaged as a whole. Members of the organization will be both EU countries and non-EU Allies, but the organization will be subordinated to the EU.

Permanent political and military committees will be establish primarily by making representatives in NATO bodies double-hatted. EUDO will take over the assets from the WEU and depend on reinforcements from NATO, who will have first call on assets.

ANALYSIS

ESDI IN NATO

Keeping the ESDI within NATO will not give the EU the status as a real military power. The EU will have the possibility to lead and conduct military operations if so decided by NATO, which in reality will mean the United States. The EU, which by now has manifested itself as a political and economic power, will essentially lack an independent military

capacity as an instrument of power to bolster its economic and diplomatic efforts.

For countries like Denmark, the non-EU Allies and the PfP countries it would be an advantage to keep the ESDI in NATO. Even though it would still be necessary to develop special agreements on how the non-EU countries could be ensured influence and participation in an operation conducted by the EU, the EU would not be the dominating body. Most of the planning and political considerations prior to a conflict would take place in NATO and thereby ensure the non-EU countries and Denmark the proper influence. The existing PfP arrangements could be extended to include EU led operations without major problems.

Seen from a US perspective, an ESDI in NATO has more advantages. NATO would remain the dominating defense alliance and the United States would still be able to decide whether NATO or EU should undertake an operation.

Looking from an organizational and military point of view ESDI in NATO gives minimum duplication and thereby a very cost-effective solution where all resources are used to enhance NATO's capabilities.

To conclude on an ESDI in NATO, it should be noted that it does not fulfill the requirements from the major powers in EU in their desire for an independent military capacity. On the other

hand, it is in line with the interests of both non-EU countries and the US and it avoids duplication.

ESDI IN THE EU

An ESDI in the EU will give the EU an independent military capacity and would be another step towards a European Federation making the EU a major power on the global scene.

It will, however increase the distance between the EU members and the non-EU Allies, who will have difficulties in gaining influence in peacetime since EU will have its own political and military bodies including a military staff.

An ESDI in the EU will decrease the influence of the United States. The EU will have the possibility to decide whether to get engaged in a conflict using its own assets. By doing this, the EU could become a competitor to NATO and NATO could end up by being responsible only for the collective defense. Depending on how the future develops, this might be the first step to the end of NATO and decrease US influence in Europe.

The build up of an independent EU military capacity including new committees, a military staff, and especially strategic assets will be very costly. It seems unlikely that any of the EU countries will increase their defense budgets.

Therefore, the only way to finance this new initiative will be to reduce the military capacity (forces/equipment/training).

Since we talk about a duplication of efforts, the overall result must be less military capacity and a weakened NATO.

To conclude, ESDI in the EU will increase the status and make all instruments of power available to the EU, while non-EU nations and especially the United States will lose influence.

Furthermore will both the political and military capacity of NATO will be decreased.

ESDI WITHIN A NEW ORGANIZATION

A new organization (EUDO) with the purpose of establishing a European capability to make autonomous military actions will not give the EU the wanted military profile even though subordinated to EU. It really would not be an independent military capacity. NATO would be the body to take the decision whether NATO or the EUDO/EU should deal with a crisis, so the EU would have to share the military status and attention with NATO and EUDO.

The EUDO would be an optimal solution for the non-EU Allies and non-NATO EU members, who would be ensured full influence and have equal rights as the EU members. The question is, are all European countries interested in becoming members of a new defense organization.

For the United States, the EUDO solution still offers the possibility for NATO to have first call on a crisis, and the

position and influence of NATO is not expected to be seriously decreased.

The EUDO will, to some extent, lead to duplication of political and military committees, while the military staff and the operational assets are based on the present capacity in the WEU and reinforcements from NATO. Some financing of the EUDO will be necessary but it is not assessed to have a major impact on the overall military capacity in NATO.

To conclude an ESDI in the form of a new organization, EUDO, will not give the EU the wanted military profile. It could solve many problems related to memberships, but it is a question whether a new organization would get the necessary back up. The United States and NATO would retain dominance when it comes to deciding on conflicts and the capacity and influence of NATO would not be seriously decreased.

COMPARISON OF MODELS

An ESDI within NATO is the most cost-effective model, making it possible to focus on the modernization of the European armies and not on duplicating already existing assets. This is an important factor, as the European defense budgets are not expected to increase in the future. On the contrary, the major economic power in the EU, Germany has reduced its defense budget to only 1.5 percent of the gross national product. The Royal

United Services Institute in London has estimated that if the Europeans wanted to build up their own alliance they would have to almost double their defense budgets.³⁴

While an ESDI linked to the EU is in line with the interests of the major European countries, none of the other models really seem to give the EU the wanted military status. The EUDO could to some extent give the Europeans a defense identity and solve the problems related to the diversity in membership of the different involved organizations. It is, however, questionable whether a new organization can be formed, particularly if none of the major powers really want it. The experience concerning European security organizations shows that there is "little room" for new organizations. So, Without the major European powers as locomotive for such an organization, it is most likely not going to be possible to establish.

This leaves an ESDI in NATO as the most effective model economically and militarily and an ESDI within the EU as the political preferred solution seen from countries like Germany, Britain and France.

CHOICE OF MODEL

Even though many European politicians want to give the EU an independent military capacity and see the EU evolving into a major power on the level below the United States, it is not

assessed that the populations and parliaments of the European countries are willing to pay the bill.

To undermine NATO, which has guaranteed the security in Europe for more than fifty years and has managed to transform according to the new security environment, seems to be unwise and unnecessary.

Then, when recommending an ESDI kept inside NATO, it is important to look at how the political desire from the major EU countries could be supported. One way might be through regularly scheduled exercises, where the EU is given the task to deal with crisis using NATO assets including part of the International Military Staff (IMS) and strategic assets. In this way, the EU would gain a military profile and the necessary expertise to make it a real capability.

CONCLUSION

The ESDI has changed its character from being a question of burden-sharing within the Alliance via a European requirement for a capability to conduct autonomously "Petersberg" operations to a new direction, where the ESDI will be a part of a CFSP.

This would allow the EU to conduct independent military operations although collective defense still would be the responsibility of NATO.

The major European countries, especially France, Britain

and Germany, seek an independent military capacity enabling the EU to control all instruments of power in a crisis situation.

Other EU countries are more diverse in the views on a future ESDI. The United States officially welcomes the latest development although the American interest is more in the direction of burden-sharing and first call for NATO in a crisis situation.

A European capability to conduct military operations must include both political and military committees as well as a military staff. This could be provided either through development of new EU institutions or by arrangement in form of reinforcements from NATO. In order to minimize costs and ensure sufficient funds to maintain a reasonable military capacity within the European Allies, duplication of efforts between the EU and NATO should be avoided.

Analyzing the possibilities for an ESDI in either NATO, the WEU or in a new European organization and taking political as well as economic and military factors into consideration, an ESDI kept within NATO is seen as the most favorable solution for a future ESDI. Although it does not give the EU an independent military capacity, it is the only realistic solution taking the decreasing European defense budgets into consideration. To establish permanent committees, a military staff and strategic assets would be very costly and thereby leave reduced budgets

for the operational forces weakening NATO's capacity.

In order to make an ESDI within NATO acceptable to the major powers of Europe, large scale exercises should be conducted on a regular basis, where substantial assets including parts of the NATO International Military Staff were made available for the EU. This would not only prepare the EU to conduct a real operation but it would also give the EU a military profile.

A future European Security and Defense Identity should be integrated as much as possible in NATO focusing on increased defense capabilities. Duplication of efforts between the EU and NATO should be avoided. If NATO decides not to be engaged as a whole, the EU would have the possibility to conduct "Petersberg Missions" by use of NATO assets. In peacetime, the EU would only possess the military assets taken over from the WEU. Regularly conducted exercises involving transfer of assets from NATO to the EU will add a military profile to the EU and prepare it to conduct "Petersberg Missions" in the future.

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid, pp. 258-259.
<sup>3</sup> Agence France Presse, Sep 22, 1999.
<sup>4</sup> New York Times, Dec 2, 1999.
<sup>5</sup> 7.kt/FMN Baggrundsnotits p. 1.
<sup>6</sup> The NATO Handbook, p. 77.
<sup>7</sup> WEU erklaering pp. 98-108.
<sup>8</sup> JFQ, p. 55.
9 Washington Summit Communiqué, para. 9-11.
10 Konklusioner fra DER/Koeln, bilag III, para. 1-5.
11 Luxembourg Declaration, pp. 1-5.
12 Presidency Conclusions - Helsinki, Part II, para. 25-28.
<sup>13</sup> International Herald Tribune, Dec 10, 1999.
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<sup>15</sup> Los Angeles Times, Dec 6, 1999.
16 7.kt/FMN Baggrundsnotits, p. 2.
<sup>17</sup> New York Times, Dec 2, 1999.
<sup>18</sup> Berlingske, 9 Dec, 1999.
19 The New York Times, Dec 17, 1999.
<sup>20</sup> Berlingske, 7 Dec, 1999.
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<sup>22</sup> Berlingske, 7 Dec, 1999.
<sup>23</sup> Berlingske, 1 Dec, 1999.
<sup>24</sup> Washington Post, Dec 16, 1999.
<sup>25</sup> London Times, Dec 8, 1999.
<sup>26</sup> Washington Post, Dec 2, 1999.
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<sup>28</sup> Washington Post, Dec 16, 1999.
<sup>29</sup> Presidency Conclusions - Helsinki, Annex 1 to Annex,
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